Summary A Sindh judicial commission has ruled that Mir Raza Ali was murdered, condemned serious police investigative failures and recommended a JIT led by DIG Irfan Baloch.
The Sindh government released the report on Tuesday, recommending a fresh, intelligence-based investigation through a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) led by Deputy Inspector General (DIG) Irfan Baloch. The commission also called for a high-level inquiry into the conduct of police officers involved in the first 10 days of the investigation, including whether evidence was concealed or manipulated.
The single-member commission, headed by Sindh High Court Justice Omar Sial, submitted its executive summary to Sindh Chief Minister Murad Ali Shah on October 15. It was established to examine the circumstances surrounding Mir Raza’s death, assess the impartiality of the police and medico-legal investigations, and identify any professional negligence, misconduct, evidence manipulation or potential cover-up.
Mir Raza, an Institute of Business Administration (IBA) graduate who ran a waffle-making business, left his home in Karachi’s PECHS area in the early hours of July 28. His family reported him missing the same day, and his body was recovered the following morning within the jurisdiction of Gulistan-e-Johar police station.
Murder, not suicide
The commission found that the police’s initial theory of suicide was inconsistent with the available medical and forensic evidence. His family had challenged that conclusion after noticing what they described as visible marks of torture on his body.
Concerns raised by the police surgeon over anomalies in the initial post-mortem report led to the exhumation of the body on August 8. The final official post-mortem report identified the cause of death as a perforating firearm injury sustained from behind, prompting investigators to add murder and destruction-of-evidence provisions to the first information report (FIR).
The commission highlighted several findings that undermined the suicide theory, including the bullet’s trajectory, the characteristics of the wound, the absence of blood, the condition of the body, acid burns and the detection of an anaesthetic substance in Mir Raza’s blood.
It said the initial police hypothesis had relied on unverified text messages, selectively obtained CCTV footage and the first post-mortem report, which had not itself established suicide as the cause of death.
The report stressed that medical, physical and forensic evidence should have been examined impartially before any conclusion was reached. It also called for further assessment of the significance of the acid injuries and the anaesthetic detected in the blood.
‘Rudderless ship’
In a sharp assessment of the investigation, the commission described the handling of the case as that of a “rudderless ship”, citing a lack of leadership, seriousness, supervision and accountability.
It characterised the investigation as ranging from negligent to “criminally negligent”, while criticising senior officers for failing to address shortcomings and, in some instances, effectively sweeping investigative lapses under the carpet.
The report also identified what it called “tunnel vision” among police officials, who remained focused on the initial suicide theory instead of pursuing alternative explanations. It suggested that professional shortcomings, ego and reluctance to acknowledge an early mistake may have contributed to the failure to examine the evidence more thoroughly.
The commission said dozens of authorised and unauthorised police personnel had become involved in collecting evidence and approaching or questioning important individuals, often without adequate documentation. It found that the lack of proper records made it difficult to establish responsibility for individual actions.
Investigators also failed to meet essential requirements for photographing and mapping the crime scene and preserving evidence. The commission raised concerns that fingerprints, DNA and other forensic material may have been compromised, while inadequate documentation weakened the integrity of the investigation.
It further criticised the police for failing to keep Mir Raza’s family and the public properly informed through official updates, despite the need for clear communication as questions about the death mounted.
The report said the possibility of an active cover-up during the early stages could not be conclusively ruled out. However, the commission clarified that it did not have investigative powers to establish definitively whether a deliberate cover-up had taken place.
CCTV and digital evidence
The handling of CCTV footage was another major concern. According to the report, there were at least nine possible routes leading to the crime scene, but police obtained footage from only one route.
The commission questioned why footage from all available surveillance cameras had not been collected and recommended a comprehensive comparison of video recordings with forensic material and other evidence to reconstruct the events surrounding the death.
It also challenged the use of Mir Raza’s financial difficulties, debts and business dealings as decisive grounds for the initial suicide theory. The commission said the information presented about his financial circumstances was insufficient to establish suicide as the cause of death.
It called for independent verification of financial transactions, loans and cryptocurrency-related records. The report also referred to WhatsApp messages, voice notes and notes on an Apple Watch, stressing the importance of bringing relevant digital evidence into the investigation and examining it alongside other material.
The commission additionally questioned the overnight change to the medical board constituted for the exhumation and further examination of Mir Raza’s body, describing the process as highly irregular.
JIT and accountability
To restore confidence in the investigation, the commission recommended forming a JIT headed by DIG Irfan Baloch, with senior representatives from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Intelligence Bureau (IB), Pakistan Rangers (Sindh) and National Cyber Crime Investigation Agency (NCCIA).
It described a JIT as the most viable route to resolving the case under the circumstances, given the compromised physical evidence and the serious questions surrounding the original investigation.
The commission separately recommended a high-level committee, preferably led by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), to investigate the conduct of officers involved in the first 10 days of the probe. The committee should determine whether officials violated Sections 201, 166(2) and 218 of the Pakistan Penal Code, which concern different forms of interference with justice and misconduct by public servants.
It called for criminal proceedings and departmental action against any officers found responsible for wrongdoing, as well as a detailed examination of possible evidence concealment and other irregularities.
The report also recommended formal inquiries into the initial investigation’s failures and urged the authorities to acknowledge the operational lapses transparently. It said the case had reached a critical juncture, with public trust in the police severely damaged and a thorough, intelligence-led investigation now essential to establish individual responsibility and examine the remaining evidence.
